



147th EAAE Seminar 'CAP Impact on Economic Growth and Sustainability of Agriculture and Rural Areas'

The role of CAP in enhancing farm incomes: the redistributive effect of direct payments in Italy

Ciliberti S. (speaker), Frascarelli A. Dept. Agr. Food and Environ. Sc. (DSA3) - University of Perugia (IT)

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OUTLINE

1. Introduction: IT choices on DPs

2. Conceptual framework: redistribution of FI

3. Research hypotheses

4. Data and methods: FADN and decomp. of G

5. Main findings

6. Discussion and Conclusion

Introduction

□ Reg.(EU) No. 1307/2013 recognised a strong mandate for each MS to manage many aspects related to DPs.

□ IT budget for DPs 2015-2019: **3.800 M EUR every year**.

Decision	National choice
Active farmer (exemption threshold)	<5000 € for mountain areas; <1250 € for other areas;.
Minimum requirements for receiving DPs	Financial threshold (250 EUR 2015-2016; 300 EURO 2017+)
Regional or national model/ internal convergence	National / Irish model (Partial convergence 60%/90% max loss 30%)
Basic payment scheme	58% of national budget
Greening (amount of payment)	30% of national budget (individual payment calculated as 30% of payment entitlements held by the farmer)
Young farmers (40 years old) scheme	1% of national budget (value: 25 % of the average value of payment entitlements)
Coupled support	11% of national budget (of which: 42% for beef, 20% for milk, 16.4% for olive oil, 10% for protein crops, 5% sugar beet, 2% for cereals)
Degressivity and Capping	50%, if dir. paym.> 150M€; 100%, if dir. paym>500M€; salary costs deducted.

The redistributive issue

According to Mishra *et al.* (2009), FI inequality has an impact on: (1) economic **well-being** (2) the adoption of farming **technology**, (3) agricultural **productivity**, and (4) **growth** in the agricultural sector.

□EU Commission has for many years expressed concerns about the inequitable distribution of FI support, as DPs are very concentrated (Allanson 2006).

□ In 2005 only **20%** of European farm households benefitted of **87%** of total DPs. High heterogeneoty acreoss EU: low (FI, NL, DK) and those with a high concentration of direct aids (PT, IT, UK, ES ,DE).

The redistributive issue (2)

□Von Witze and Noleppa (2007) highlighted that even though SM farms should represent the target of DPs, the main beneficiaries are farms with large UAA.

□ Other studies have concluded that government payments **increase income concentration** (Allanson 2006; Schmid et al. 2006; El Benni et al. 2012).

□ However, several studies conducted in Europe have shown that DPs cause **income inequality to decrease** and that without DPs the concentration of FI and its unequal distribution across farm could have increased (Keeney 2000; Frawley and Keeny 2000; Severini and Tantari 2013a; 2013b; 2015).

Research hypotheses

Against the theoretical background and in light of the Italian choices on DPs the following research hypotheses are tested:

H1: CAP reform in Italy causes a decrease of the concentration of DPs.

H2: CAP reform in Italy improves the redistributive role of DPs.

Data and methods

In practice, <u>the static analysis of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient (G)</u> aims to investigate the concentration of total income as the sum of incomes concentration from k different sources Yk:

$$G = \sum_{k=1}^{k} \frac{\operatorname{cov}[Yk, F(Y)]}{\operatorname{cov}[Yk, F(Yk)]} * \frac{2\operatorname{cov}[Yk, F(Yk)]}{\mu k} * \frac{\mu}{\mu k} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} Rk * Gk * Sk = \sum_{k=1}^{K} Ck * Sk$$

In order to evaluate the marginal impact of a single income component on income inequality, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) derived a measure of **elasticity** (η_k) of the G:

$$\eta_k = \frac{u_k}{G} * \frac{dG}{du_k} = \frac{1}{G} * \left[\frac{u_k}{\mu} * (C_k - G) \right]$$

The (static) analyses of the decomposition of G have been applied:

- i) <u>Ex post analysis</u> -> IT FADN database for the year 2013 (n= 11.319 farms);
- *ii)* <u>Ex ante analysis</u> -> simulation of DPs in 2020

Main findings

Table 1. Gini decomposition of total income. Year 2013.



	Gini	Correlation	Share	Concentration	
	coefficient	coefficient	coefficient	coefficient	
	Gk	Rk	Sk	Ck	
FI=MI+	DPs				
MI	0.871	0.985	0.796	0.858	
DPs	0.647	0.666	0.204	0.431	
FI	0.770	1.000	1.020	0.770	
FI=MI+(BP+GR)					
MI	0.871	0.985	0770	0.258	
BP + GR	0.646	0.645	0.185	0.417	
Ср	0.922	0.612	0.019	0.564	
FI	0.770	1.000	1.000	3 .770	
	P	roportional con	tribution to	Elasticity (%)	
		inequali	ty	Liusticity (70)	
		Pk		η	
FI=MI+DPs					
Μ	I	0.886	5	0.090	
DF	Ps	0.114		-0.090	
F	ſ	1.000		0.000	
FI=MI+(I	BP+GR)				
MI		9.086	j	0.090	
BP + (GR	0.100		-0.085	
Ср		0.014		-0.005	
FI		1.000		0.000	

Table 2. Gini decomposition of total income. Year 2020.

Discussion	and	conc	usion

$\frac{\text{H1} (\text{CAP} 15-20 \text{ decreases the}}{\text{concentration of DPs}} \rightarrow \text{CONFIRMED}$	H2 (CAP 15-20 improves the redistributive role of DPs) →REJECTED		
✓ the introduction of the new DPs scheme in Italy leads to more equal redistribution of DPs.	 ✓ the share of FI from DPs declines. ✓ reduces the ability to contrast the unequal redistributive effect of the MI. 		
✓ BP and GR less concentrated than SPS and reduce the prop. contr. to inequality.			
Due to	Due to:		
The national model of DPSs +	Dudget cut for DPs in IT (-665 M EUR; - 15.2% 2019 vs 2013) \rightarrow (external		
□IRm of internal convergence,	convergence).		
that bridge the gap of entitlements value across farms and make DPs (>20% of FI) less dependent on the rank of FI.	CP instead of RP and PANC: missed chance		





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Thank you for the attention

stefano.ciliberti@studenti.unipg.it

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